Science and technology in the People's Republic of China have developed rapidly from the 1980s to the 2020s, with major scientific and technological progress over the last four decades. From the 1980s to the 1990s, the government of the People's Republic of China successively launched the 863 Program and the "Strategy to Revitalize the Country Through Science and Education", which greatly promoted the development of China's science and technological institutions.
As per the Global Innovation Index in 2025, China was considered one of the most innovative in the world, ranking 10th globally, third in the Asia & Oceania region, and second for large countries with a population of over 100 million.
China was a global scientific and technological leader up until the early years of the Ming dynasty. Ancient and medieval Chinese discoveries and Chinese innovations such as papermaking, printing, the compass, and gunpowder (the Four Great Inventions) contributed to the economic development of ancient and medieval East Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Chinese scientific activity began to neuter and wane around the fourteenth century. Unlike in Europe and other parts of the Western World, Chinese engineers and scientists did not attempt to reduce observations of nature to mathematical laws and nor did they not form a scholarly community with criticisms and progressive research. In the Chinese Confucian cultural ethos dating back to the Han dynasty, Confucian philosophers held a strong focus by placing an overemphasis on literature, the arts, and public administration, while scientific and technological pursuits were looked down upon in terms of prestige and respectability and regarded to be unworthy endeavors that were fell far beneath their social pay grade as such domains of inquiry were seen as trivial or restricted to limited practical applications. One contributing factor is believed to be the imperial examination system, which deprived the incentives that encouraged up-and-coming Chinese intellectuals to actively engage in scientific and technological endeavors. The absence of motivating factors rooted in the imperial examinations stifled the development of scientific and technological innovation and resulted in a stagnation of Chinese scientific and technological creativity and development over the last several centuries. By the 17th century, Europe and the Western world surpassed China in scientific and technological advancement. The causes of this early modern Great Divergence continue to be debated by scholars to this day.
After being defeated repeatedly by Japan and Western nations in the 19th century, Chinese reformers began promoting modern science and technology as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement. After the Communist victory in 1949 science and technology research was organized based on the model of the Soviet Union. It was characterized by a bureaucratic organization led by non-scientists, research according to the goals of central plans, separation of research from production, specialized research institutes, concentration on practical applications, and restrictions on information flows. Researchers should work as collectives for society rather than as individuals seeking recognition. Many studied in the Soviet Union which also transferred technology. The Soviet Union provided 10,000 experts to China to facilitate its development.
China began a formal computing development program in 1956 when it launched the Twelve-Year Science Plan and formed the Beijing Institute of Computing Technology under the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
From the 1950s until the end of the Mao era, China emphasized self-reliance in scientific and technological development. This resulted from its relative international isolation and its ideological stance.
Beginning in 1964, China through the Third Front construction built a self-sufficient industrial base in its hinterlands as a strategic reserve in the event of war with the Soviet Union or the United States. The Third Front construction was primarily carried out in secret, with the location for Third Front projects following the principle of “close to the mountains, dispersed, and hidden” (靠山, 分散, 隐蔽; kàoshān, fēnsàn, yǐnbì). From 1964-1974, China invested more than 40% of its industrial capacity in Third Front regions. After Nixon's China trip in 1972, investment to the Third Front region gradually declined. Rapprochement between the United States and China decreased the fear of invasion which motivated the Third Front construction. Through its distribution of infrastructure, industry, and human capital around the country, the Third Front created favorable conditions for subsequent market development and private enterprise.
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which sought to remove perceived bourgeois influences and attitudes, caused large negative effects and disruptions. Construction of the Third Front slowed during its early stages. Among other measures it saw the scientific community and formal education attacked, intellectuals were sent to do manual labor, universities and academic journals were closed, most research ceased, and for nearly a decade China trained no new scientists and engineers.
In 1966, China transitioned from vacuum-tube computers to fully transistorized computers. In the mid-1960s through the late 1960s, China began a semiconductor program and was producing third-generation computers by 1972.
After Mao Zedong's death, S&T was established as one of the Four Modernizations in 1976. The new leader Deng Xiaoping, and architect of the reform and opening up, was a strong promoter of S&T and reversed the policies of the Cultural revolution. The Soviet inspired system was then gradually reformed. Media began promoting the value of S&T, scientific thinking, and scientific achievement.The third and fourth generations of leaders came almost exclusively from technical backgrounds.
In March 1986, China launched the large-scale technology development plan, the 863 Project.
The State Council of the People's Republic of China in 1995 issued the "Decision on Accelerating S&T Development" which described planned Science & Technology development for the coming decades. It described S&T as the chief productive force and affecting economic development, social progress, national strength, and living standards. S&T should become closely associated with market needs. Not only Soviet style institutes should do research but also universities and private industries. State institutions should form joint ventures with Chinese or foreign venture capital in order for S&T developments to reach the industry. S&T personal should become more occupationally mobile, pay should be linked to economic results, and age and seniority should become less important for personal decisions. Intellectual property rights should be respected. Information exchange should improve and there should be competition and open bidding on projects. The environment should be protected. Chinese indigenous S&T in certain key areas should be especially promoted. Public officials should improve their understanding of S&T and incorporate S&T in decision making. Society, including Communist Party youth organizations, labor unions and the mass media, should actively promote respect for knowledge and human talents.
Since the 1990s, China has concentrated on building physical infrastructure such as roads and ports. During the 2010s, a policy was implemented requiring technology transfer as a condition for foreign companies wanting entry into the Chinese market. However, China has shifted its growing focus towards prioritizing indigenous innovation to meet its national scientific and technological requirements. During this period China has succeeded in developing an innovation infrastructure, founded on the establishment of over 100 science and technology parks in many parts of the country, along with encouragement of entrepreneurship outside the state-owned sector. Yip and McKern argue that Chinese firms have evolved through three phases as their innovation capabilities have matured and that by 2017 many of them are of world standard. They are now strong competitors in the China market and increasingly in foreign markets, where they are establishing local operations.
While the term "techno-nationalism" was originally applied to the United States in the 1980s, it has since been used to describe nationalistic technology policies in many countries, particularly in Asia. Chinese techno-nationalism is rooted in the country's humiliation at the hands of more advanced countries in the 19th century. Indeed, China's leaders (like those of other countries) have long seen scientific and technological development as vital for achieving economic affluence, national security, and national prestige. Lacking indigenous technological intellectual property and innovation are seen as key national problems. The 21st century has thus seen a series of central government initiatives designed to promote "indigenous innovation" and technological development more generally in China. These include the National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–20), the Strategic Emerging Industries initiative, the Internet Plus initiative, and the Made in China 2025 Program, among others.
Through these initiatives, the Chinese state has intervened in the economy in a variety of ways to promote national technological development and reduce reliance on other countries. Prioritized industries and firms are protected and guided. There are systematic efforts to replace foreign technology and intellectual properties with indigenous technology. Foreign companies are given many incentives for technology transfer and for moving R&D to China. At the same time the technological abilities of domestic companies are supported in various ways. Such policies have generated considerable conflict between China and developed countries, particularly the United States, although China has often proven flexible when its policies have been challenged.
Nationalism and nationalistic achievements have been seen as becoming the main ideological justifications and societal glue for the regime as Marxism loses influence. Some science and technology mega-projects have been viewed as questionable trophy projects done for propaganda purposes with Chinese state-controlled media being filled with reports of Chinese achievements. In 2019, reports surfaced stating that the Chinese government has ordered all foreign PC hardware and operating systems that are installed in government offices to be replaced in the next three years. Other reports stated that the Chinese government would be increasing subsidies for tech firms.
In its Medium and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006–2020), China fixed itself the target of devoting 2.5% of GDP to research and development by 2020. Between 2003 and 2012, gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) rose from 1.13% to 1.98% of GDP, suggesting that the country was on track to meet its target.
The research firm Battelle estimates that China's GERD will exceed that of the United States by 2023. However, several convergent factors cast doubt over the accuracy of Battelle's prediction: the deceleration in China's rate of economic growth in 2014, the considerable drop in industrial production since 2012 and the major stock market slide in mid-2015. After progressing rapidly for a decade, GERD stabilized at 2.07% of GDP in 2015.
China devoted 5.1% of total research spending to basic research in 2015, according to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. This is up from 4.8%, on average, over the past decade, but less than in 2004 (6.0%). The prolonged policy focus on experimental development has resulted in enterprises contributing three-quarters of Chinese research spending (77% of total expenditure on R&D in 2015). Enterprises focus on experimental development, which accounted for as much as 97% of their total research expenditure by 2015. Business enterprises contributed 60% of GERD in 2000 and 74% in 2008. In 2004, 74% of GERD went on experimental development. China aims to increase the share of basic research to 15% of total research spending by 2020.
The State Council of the People's Republic of China is the top administrative organ in China. Immediately below it are several ministries and ministry level organizations involved with various aspects of science and technology. The State Council Science and Education Leading Group, consisting of the leaders of the major science bodies, attempts to organize the national policy. Efficiency of overall coordination has been questioned with various agencies seen as having overlapping missions and rivalries for resources and sometimes engaging in wasteful duplication.
The Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China, formerly the State Science and Technology Commission, is the body primarily responsible for science and technology strategy and policy. It also administers national research programs, S&T development zones, and international cooperation. The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China oversees education as well as research institutes at universities. Several other ministries such as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People's Republic of China, the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China, and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China are also involved in S&T.
The National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Sciences directs planning for social sciences and philosophy.
The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is the most prestigious professional science organization in China with China's scientific elite being members. It directs many research institutes, research programs, graduate training programs, and gives influential advice. The Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) gives important advice but unlike the CAS does not have research institutes of its own. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has a similar role to CAS for social sciences and philosophy. There are also many more narrow academies such as the Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences.
The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) gives grants to individual researchers after peer-review.
The People's Liberation Army General Armaments Department directs military R&D.
The national scientific and academic organizations affiliated to the China Association for Science and Technology are also important forces in scientific and technological research.
The Society of Chinese Scientific Journalism presides over the Society of Chinese Technical Communication, China's first government approved technical communication association. Since 2002, the group has held annual conferences.
Research is carried out by governmental research institutes, in higher learning institutions, and by private enterprises.
Local governments have become increasingly important in R&D funding and may now contribute up to half of government spending. Intense rivalry for research and high tech industry has been argued to sometimes create wasteful subsidized overcapacity, dispersal of efforts better centralized in a few localities, and poorly judged bureaucratic subsidizing of technologies that soon become out-dated.
As of 2010, China's national R&D programs encompassed the:
Key Technologies Program (renamed in 2006 as "zhicheng" or Support)
National High Technology Program (863 Program)
National Basic Research Program (973 Program)
Spark Program - Rural technology
Torch Program - New technology commercialization by creating special hi-tech zones and incubators
Key Laboratories Program
Engineering Research Centers
State Key and New Product Program
Innovation Fund for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
Special Technology Development Project for Research Institutes
Action Plan for Promoting Trade by Science and Technology
National New Products Program
Agricultural S&T Transfer Fund
The major national programs received 15-20% of government R&D spending in 2010. They funded research, after a stated competitive proposal procedure, in universities, institutes, and enterprise. Important project may receive funding from several programs. The programs have arguably had a strong effect but have also been involved in scandals, corruption and fraud. They have been accused mainly of producing derivative works rather than driving innovation and it has been claimed that they ignore merit in selecting projects in favor of cronyism. China is trying to improve its efficiency through measures such as more peer-review and evaluations.
In 2014, the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund was established in an effort to reduce dependence on foreign semiconductor companies.
As of 2010, China's national R&D programs encompassed the:
Key Technologies Program (renamed in 2006 as "zhicheng" or Support)
National High Technology Program (863 Program)
National Basic Research Program (973 Program)
Spark Program - Rural technology
Torch Program - New technology commercialization by creating special hi-tech zones and incubators
Key Laboratories Program
Engineering Research Centers
State Key and New Product Program
Innovation Fund for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
Special Technology Development Project for Research Institutes
Action Plan for Promoting Trade by Science and Technology
National New Products Program
Agricultural S&T Transfer Fund
The major national programs received 15-20% of government R&D spending in 2010. They funded research, after a stated competitive proposal procedure, in universities, institutes, and enterprise. Important project may receive funding from several programs. The programs have arguably had a strong effect but have also been involved in scandals, corruption and fraud. They have been accused mainly of producing derivative works rather than driving innovation and it has been claimed that they ignore merit in selecting projects in favor of cronyism. China is trying to improve its efficiency through measures such as more peer-review and evaluations.
In 2014, the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund was established in an effort to reduce dependence on foreign semiconductor companies.
China's Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) are special areas designed to attract foreign investment, promote exports, and drive economic growth. Established in 1984, these zones have become a crucial part of China's economic strategy, with 232 national-level ETDZs across the country as of 2024
Key Features of ETDZs:
Preferential Policies: Tax incentives, land subsidies, and streamlined regulations to attract foreign investment
Infrastructure: Well-developed infrastructure, including transportation, logistics, and communication systems
Industry Focus: Focus on high-tech industries, manufacturing, and services, with a emphasis on innovation and R&D
Global Engagement: Many ETDZs are located in coastal areas, facilitating international trade and investment
Types of ETDZs:
Special Economic Zones (SEZs): Focus on export-oriented manufacturing and foreign investment
High-Tech Industrial Development Zones (HIDZs): Focus on high-tech research and development
Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) Focus on manufacturing and services
Free Trade Zones (FTZs): Focus on international trade and investment
Benefits of ETDZs:
Job Creation: Over 30 million jobs created
Economic Growth: Contributed 22% to China's GDP in 2024
Foreign Investment: Attracted 45% of China's foreign direct investment
Innovation: Fostered innovation and R&D in high-tech industries
China's education system is massive, with over 3,000 colleges and universities and 48.46 million students enrolled in higher education. The country has made significant strides in research and development, with the number of R&D personnel growing steadily to 6.353 million in 2022, ranking first globally
Education Highlights:
Higher Education: 3,119 institutions, with 48.46 million students enrolled
University Enrollment Rate: 60.8% in 2024
International Students: China hosts the second-largest international student population, with 492,185 students in 2018
R&D Personnel:
Total R&D Personnel: 6.353 million (2022)
Full-Time Equivalent: 4.381 million person-years (2018)
Researchers: 1.866 million person-years (2018)
Growth Rate: 8.6% increase in R&D personnel (2018)
China's investment in education and R&D has led to significant advancements, with the country surpassing the US in scientific publications and ranking among the top globally in various university rankings
The Chinese diaspora is a massive global community, with over 60 million people of Chinese descent living outside of mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. This diaspora has a rich history, dating back to the 10th century with the opening of the maritime Silk Road
Historical Waves of Migration:
Early Migrations: Chinese traders and explorers settled in Southeast Asia, particularly in present-day Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
19th-20th Centuries: Mass migration to the Americas, Australia, and Europe, driven by economic hardship, political instability, and the Opium Wars.
Post-1980s: Increased migration to industrialized countries, with a focus on education, economic opportunities, and political stability
Global Distribution:
Southeast Asia: Largest concentration, with over 30 million Chinese in countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Americas: Over 9.8 million Chinese, with significant populations in the US, Canada, and Peru.
Europe: Growing presence, with notable communities in the UK, France, and Italy.
Africa: Increasing numbers, driven by China's Belt and Road Initiative
The Chinese diaspora plays a vital role in fostering cultural exchange, economic growth, and international trade.
Industrial espionage in China is a complex issue . The country has faced allegations of intellectual property theft and trade secret misappropriation, with some cases involving state-sponsored actors. China's rapid economic growth and industrialization have raised concerns about IP protection.
Key Points:
Allegations: China accused of industrial espionage, particularly in tech and manufacturing.
Cases: Notable examples include semiconductor and AI technology theft.
China's stance: Denies allegations, emphasizing innovation and IP protection efforts.
The US and other countries have taken steps to protect their interests, including export controls and investigations.
China's international cooperation is quite extensive, covering various areas such as trade, investment, science and technology, and development assistance.
Economic Cooperation:
China has become a major player in global trade, with over 150 countries and regions considering it their primary trade partner. In 2025, China's imports of goods and services are projected to exceed $15 trillion, while its accumulated outbound investment has generated over $300 billion in tax revenue for host countries.
Science and Technology Cooperation:
China has established science and technology cooperation relationships with over 160 countries and regions. It has signed 119 inter-governmental sci-tech cooperation agreements and joined over 200 international organizations and multilateral mechanisms. China is also actively participating in international mega-science programs, such as the Deep-time Digital Earth.
Development Assistance:
China's international development cooperation is managed by the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA). CIDCA focuses on promoting economic development, reducing poverty, and improving people's livelihoods in partner countries. China has provided significant development assistance to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):
The BRI is a key platform for China's international cooperation, aiming to promote economic development, infrastructure connectivity, and people-to-people exchanges. China has established over 70 "Belt and Road" joint laboratories with nearly 50 countries and set up 10 international technology transfer platforms.
Partnerships:
China has established partnerships with various countries and regions, including the European Union, the United States, and countries in Africa and Asia. These partnerships focus on promoting economic cooperation, science and technology exchange, and cultural understanding.
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